Getting a Handle on Distribution Yield

Here’s the description and objective for an ETF that’s pulling in the assets these days:

The Strategy Shares Nasdaq 7HANDL™ Index ETF (HNDL) is a first-of-its-kind target distribution ETF designed to seek investment results that correlate generally, before fees and expenses, to the price and yield performance of the Nasdaq 7HANDL™ Index.

The index is split into two components, with a 50% allocation to fixed income and equity ETFs (the “Core Portfolio”) and a 50% allocation to a “Dorsey Wright Explore Portfolio,” a tactical allocation with U.S. fixed-income, U.S. blend, U.S. equity and U.S. alternative assets, or categories that have historically provided high levels of income.

The Nasdaq 7HANDL ETF has adopted a policy to pay monthly distributions on Fund shares at a target rate that represents an annualized payout of approximately 7.0% on the Fund’s per-share net asset value on the date of a distribution’s declaration.  All or a portion of a distribution may consist of a return of capital from the original investment and the distribution rate may be modified at any time.

As they say, there’s a lot going on there.

Let’s start with the target audience.  A seven percent yield sounds good to most anyone these days, but HNDL appears to be specifically designed to attract individuals, and the list of firms reporting holdings in it (via 13F filings) is almost exclusively brokers and registered investment advisors, as you would expect.

How would you go about analyzing the fund?

The current allocation is 43% bonds, 26% stocks, 21% defensive stocks/alternatives, and 10% cash.  On the surface, given the capital markets assumptions of most firms, you couldn’t expect to get to the target yield over the next few years, even assuming heroic allocation moves.  But the since-inception annualized return is 7.09%, which is certainly convenient.

Here’s a look at relative performance and assets over that time:

The fund reports performance against the Aggregate, and Morningstar puts it in the Conservative Target Allocation category.  Given the portfolio makeup and the obvious equity beta displayed via the chart, the Aggregate is an inappropriate benchmark — and the fund maybe should be in a different Morningstar category too.

The third line in the top panel shows performance against the underlying index for the ETF, illustrating the persistent weight of fees and expenses.

As you can see in the bottom panel, assets have exploded this year.  Perhaps buyers are comparing the fund to those indexes, even if they don’t really fit.  But there’s another factor:  that distribution yield.

A flyer on the website is titled “Return of Capital (ROC) Distributions Explained.”  It lays out the case for ROCs and when they can turn out to be beneficial, including an “example of potential tax benefits.”  A contrary example is not provided.

A small section says, “Look at the change in a fund’s NAV to understand the economic impact of the ROC distribution”:

Did the fund’s NAV rise over the long-term and is it likely to do so in the future?

» Yes:  earned distribution that is constructive and positive for the investor.

» No:  the fund did not earn its distribution, which can be destructive and ultimately dilutive for the investor.

Which brings us back to the likelihood of reaching that seven percent distribution, the monthly equivalent of which is paid out like clockwork — and to whether buyers understand the possibilities regarding the return of capital under various scenarios.

SEC rules require funds to provide estimates of the return-of-capital portion “whenever the distribution comes from a source other than the net investment income earned by the fund.”  Yet, because the interim numbers aren’t official, many data platforms list the whole amount as income and/or report the rate for the year as “yield.”

The term “distribution yield” is technically correct, but confusing to many people who don’t understand the nuance involved, yet the ETF provider uses that heavily in its marketing efforts (as in its press release when the fund crossed the billion-dollar mark).

Would you be a buyer or a seller of HNDL?  What do you think the assets under management will be a year from now, or five years from now?

Published: November 16, 2021

Subscribe

To comment, please send an email to editor@investmentecosystem.com. Comments are for the editor and are not viewable by readers.

Crosscurrents and the Balance of Fixity and Change

This biweekly piece highlights a range of happenings in the ecosystem.  Please send a note if you have comments or ideas for future issues.

Crosscurrents

One-way markets no more?  In recent weeks, volatility has picked up in fixed income, as debates rage about inflation (are these high levels transitory or not?) and central banks start to change policies at different times.  Cycles of sentiment have moved rates in one direction and then the other, and investors have struggled to get their footing in the new environment.

To wit:

“Government-Bond Swings Burn Wall Street Investors” (WSJ).

“Central bank induced bond tumult stings big name hedge funds” (FT).

“Central Bankers Are Blowing Up Macro Hedge Funds” (Bloomberg).

Each story (and there have been others, too) includes a slightly different list of funds that have taken it on the chin.  There have been a few notable winners as well.  The tendency is to ascribe skill or the lack of it to such short-term results, when it’s but a skirmish in a longer battle.

The bigger questions remain:

After more than a decade of inflation undershooting expectations (and central bankers allowing that more inflation would be nice and not thinking it could get turned on easily), are we switching gears to a different economic regime?

Are central banks behind the curve?

Will the trading strategies (and the use of ample leverage) of the past continue to work when yield structures are morphing, out of sync with each other, around the world?

Will risk assets more broadly start to misbehave in response to changes in the fixed income markets?

Some perspective:

Due diligence

The print edition headline for a New York Times article about the Elizabeth Holmes trial summed up one angle of her defense:  “Investors Exposed As Anything But Diligent.”  For example, someone investing on behalf of the DeVos family (which lost $100 million) “testified that she was scared Ms. Holmes would cut her firm out of the deal if they dug deeper into the details of Theranos’s business.”  That’s not an isolated case.  Access to a hot company or a famed manager often becomes more important than surfacing differential information, which is what due diligence should be all about.

In a posting about culture and brand positioning by asset managers, Joe Wiggins wrote, “It is so often vacuous nonsense — a superficial effort to manage perceptions. . . . There is often a yawning gulf between what a firm says about its culture and what it actually does.”  Bridging that gap requires a different set of skills than most investment analysts hone.

Pensions

Mercer and CFA Institute have issued the Global Pension Index 2021.  The report rates the adequacy, sustainability, and integrity of retirement systems around the world.  There is a section on each country, providing a brief description of its system and the ratings the organizations give overall and in each category.

CEM Benchmarking released the latest version its annual update, “Asset Allocation and Fund Performance of Defined Benefit Pension Funds in the United States, 1998-2019.”

Sell-side rankings

Institutional Investor published a series of articles announcing its “All-America Research Team” and celebrating the fiftieth group to be recognized.  The listing and its methodology have come in for criticism over the years and it is less of a big deal than it once was, as the superstar analyst culture has faded from its peak.  Integrity Research Associates asks, “All-America Research Rankings: Are They Worth the Effort?”

Other reads

Phil Huber, “The Paper Trail.”  These monthly pieces are thoughtfully curated, and cover a broad range of topics and sources.  Here’s the latest.

Marc Rubinstein, “Prime Time in Crypto.”  A short history of prime brokerage (including that Archegos kerfuffle earlier this year) and prospects for that activity for cryptocurrencies.

Charles Skorina, “Ultras from Venus, CIOs from Mars.”  What some family offices want from a chief investment officer is much different than what other asset owners want.  (And from asset managers and from advisory firms, etc.)

Citywire RIA, “CI says RIA consolidation is in ‘first or second inning’; plans more buys.”  How much longer will the RIA rollup game last?

Goldman Sachs, “EM ex-China as a separate equity asset class.”  Categorization always evolves, if slowly sometimes, and always matters; this strategy paper is full of interesting exhibits.

Frederik Gieschen, “The Reading Obsession.”  Yes, Warren Buffett reads a lot, but that’s not all.

The Investment Ecosystem postings

Recent pieces cover the search for assets (T. Rowe Price edition), puzzling over asset owners paying extra for beta, the pull of performancelessons from a famed hedge fund manager, and forces in the ecosystem.

Don’t forget to sign up for a plan if you haven’t already (the Founder subscription is only available through year end).  Also check out the posting archives, to see the range of content during the first weeks of the site, and the due diligence course.

Quote

“Wisdom lies neither in fixity nor in change, but in the dialectic between the two.” — Octavio Paz.

Published: November 14, 2021

Subscribe

To comment, please send an email to editor@investmentecosystem.com. Comments are for the editor and are not viewable by readers.

T. Rowe Price and the Search for Assets

Asset management at scale is a very attractive business.

T. Rowe Price since 1993:

The top panel shows the change in — and tremendous level of — the net profit margin of the firm.  In the middle is the percentage change in revenues, displaying the obvious challenge:  weak markets lead to lower revenues.  At bottom, you can see that TROW has vastly outperformed the S&P 500 over this period, although it is roughly flat versus its relative peak in 2008.

Assets under management are now more than $1.6 trillion, about six times what they were in early 2009:

But other than a strong second quarter of inflows in 2020, organic growth in assets has been a challenge.  Aggregate flows have been fairly flat over the last three years, while assets are up 60%.

The company has been making moves to bolster assets.  It has introduced ETFs, starting with five semi-transparent equity products, which have had relatively modest flows.  Three bond funds debuted recently.

In addition, it has reopened its midcap funds, which have been closed to new investors for more than a decade.  The performance since that time:

PMEGX is the institutional version of the strategy and RPMGX is one class of the standard offering.  As is apparent from the chart, they move in tandem, with the difference in expenses contributing to the gap over time.

The combined assets for all of the classes of the two funds are shown at the bottom.  Additional context comes from a Morningstar update, which states that the strategy had more than $78 billion in assets in June, so other portfolios are to be found under this umbrella.  The article says that there have been outflows across the strategy of more than $11 billion in the last two years, the related selling for which has resulted in “larger-than-average capital gains distributions.”  Morningstar gives the funds its highest analyst rating of Gold.

The midcap strategy is one of six that will be moving to a new entity, T. Rowe Price Investment Management, which will be separate from T. Rowe Price Associates.

In general, T. Rowe Price has been known for producing good returns across its portfolios, the last decade of which (for its mutual funds) is summarized on page nine of the firm’s latest earnings release.  But, according to one sell-side analyst, “While T. Rowe has historically had best-in-class performance, results more recently have deteriorated.”  It remains to be seen if that is just normal variability or something else.

Some questions:

How big should a midcap strategy be to produce strong relative returns?

How big can an asset management firm grow and still maintain a culture of outperformance?

What will be the impact of cleaving part of the existing organization into a sister one?

In its most dramatic action of late, the firm announced that it is getting into the acquisitions game, buying private credit manager Oak Hill.  That fits with the moves of other managers who are trying to get some relief from the bruising competition and fee pressure in traditional asset categories by moving into hot, higher-margin ones.  Those aggressive moves don’t come cheap — and they face the risk of coming too late in a well-developed trend.

As they say, these are nice problems to have.  T. Rowe Price remains a highly-profitable, widely-admired firm.  But it faces the challenge of trying to build its pile of assets even higher, while delivering attractive results for its clients.

Published: November 12, 2021

Subscribe

To comment, please send an email to editor@investmentecosystem.com. Comments are for the editor and are not viewable by readers.

Resisting the Force Field of Observed Performance

The introduction to a Citywire Selector video reads, “Dropping fund managers for non-performance reasons, or cutting back on outperformers who may have become too big, are two of the most challenging aspects of fund selection, according to an expert panel of fund buyers in Milan.”

In each case, the problem emanates from the primacy of performance in manager selection, retention, and “de-selection.”  Let’s take the two challenges one at a time.

If you survey organizations about the reasons that managers are fired, you get quite a mix of responses.  A few report that most managers are let go for performance reasons, but that’s not the normal distribution.  Instead, the “fired for performance” percentage is strangely low.

Do a little digging and you find that non-performance concerns often precede the firing of a manager.  But as long as the performance is good, there is a reluctance to act.  When the numbers deteriorate and a change is made, what’s the reason for breaking the relationship?  The qualitative concerns came first, but they weren’t sufficient to lead to action. So the real reason for making the change was performance, even if it’s reported to be because of something else.

The reluctance to act while the numbers look good is reinforced by others, including investment committees, advisors, clients, and other interested parties.  No one wants to step away from a winner over “concerns.”

In a similar fashion, recommendations to cut back on managers that have grown too big can lead to pushback.

There are a variety of flavors of “grown too big.”  Within a portfolio, a strong performer can alter the allocation mix over time, raising important questions about rebalancing policy and whether to let winners run rather than trim them.  That’s a matter of investment belief, which should be outlined in advance and implemented accordingly.

Another too-big risk is that the relationship between manager and allocator changes over time.  Increased familiarity and comfort can lead to diligence standards that are more lax (without intending for that to happen).  Bigger positions should require more attention, but they also engender more faith, which can be a powerful deterrent to clear-eyed observation.  Long relationships are good for managers and investors alike, but not if you can’t recognize the changes that are taking place or aren’t willing to act on them.

And there is a pronounced tendency for asset managers to focus on growing assets rather than trying to stay at a size that’s optimal for performance.  Yet determining the capacity of a fund, of a strategy, or of an organization is difficult (and accepting the capacity projections of managers foolhardy).  Greater scale does not always lead to a deterioration of performance, but there is no doubt that’s the general effect.

As with voicing qualitative qualms, fretting about any of these matters of size usually does not resonate with others, unless the performance is deteriorating already.

To fight these inherent tendencies:

Track the number of procyclical decisions (as to performance) versus countercyclical ones.  Do it for hiring decisions and firing decisions.  If the ratios are heavily skewed (and they almost always are), then performance is overwhelming everything else.

Be clear about your beliefs regarding the assessment of performance versus other elements of manager analysis.  If qualitative factors are truly important, design ways to ensure that they are given their proper due in decision making.  Make sure your approach matches the narrative description of it.

Repeatedly communicate with others (governing boards, advisors, clients, etc.) about those beliefs and the difficult decisions that are required if the purpose of manager selection is estimating the probability of future outperformance rather than reacting to reported performance.

The keeping-track part is simple.  The other recommendations are not.  But it’s hard to resist the force field of observed performance without that kind of commitment.

Published: November 11, 2021

Subscribe

To comment, please send an email to editor@investmentecosystem.com. Comments are for the editor and are not viewable by readers.

Forces in the Ecosystem

The topics to be covered by The Investment Ecosystem will range from the common to the arcane.  No doubt there will be ideas that move to the forefront down the road that aren’t even on the proverbial radar screen yet.

That said, certain themes that form the backdrop for the analyses of today’s investment developments are likely to be with us throughout the (hopefully long) life of this endeavor.   Here are some of the persistent forces that drive the ecosystem, which you’ll see appear in ways large and small in the years to come.

Segmentation

We have a natural need to categorize, creating segments for easier analysis and communication.  Not that those divisions always add clarity or that we live in a world of universal definitions.

No matter if you’re trying to sort out asset classes or strategies or organizations, imprecision and disconnects among different categorization schemes abound.  Why?  We inhabit a complex landscape, causing some of us to see the dividing lines in different places than others — and those lines move over time as the ecosystem changes.

Take “hedge funds.”  Once fairly homogeneous, the vehicles that fall under that general term now encompass a wide range of strategies that are often totally unrelated to each other.  A given fund can be put in quite disparate “buckets” of categorization by similar asset owners.  And the firms that manage the funds can vary markedly in size and form.  (However, some elements show more commonality, including legal structure, liquidity terms, and incentives.)

Despite the challenges, categorizing actors within the ecosystem aids in both micro and macro analyses.  On the micro front, segmentation allows us to compare and contrast counterparties and strategies within reasonable boundaries (and, in doing so, provides us with feedback for the ongoing updating of our categorization framework).

In addition, finely-drawn segments have attributes and tendencies that can inform macro analysis of the workings of the whole ecosystem.  Efficient market theory assumes that participants are rational decision makers operating without constraints, but one benefit of segmentation is seeing how unrealistic that is.  Legal, behavioral, and normative constraints abound, and vary considerably.

Aggregation

A fallback position of those arguing for efficiency is that the aggregated activity of market participants overwhelms those constraints, resulting in an efficiency that fits their theory.  But even if markets can be described as quite efficient much of the time, sizable dislocations occur more frequently than the theory would predict.

Nevertheless, aggregation is a powerful force, often working in the direction of efficiency, leading to a compression of opportunities in previously fruitful areas.  All the while, greater scale is built into strategies and organizations, which can lead to instability under conditions of stress.

Migration

Despite our proclivity for categorization, ideas don’t confine themselves to individual segments.  They get passed around the ecosystem.

The prevailing movement tends to be from “institutional” to “retail,” with one of the best examples being the propagation of alternative strategies over the last quarter century.  The endowment model of investing — at least the part of it expressed in a proliferation of new asset class exposures — has spread from a narrow group of adherents to become implemented far and wide.

A different kind of migration happened just before that movement got going (and contributed to it), when hedge funds went through a period of “institutionalization,” evolving from being the province of smallish managers serving private investors to a dynamic part of the industry full of influential players.

Another major migration was occurring in parallel to these changes — the march of indexation.  Viewed as opposing developments, they also fed each other in various ways, including via allocation strategies that featured a cheap core of passive exposures surrounded by expensive, complex, and opaque vehicles.

These are big examples, trends that have dominated the industry for years.  But they started small — and there are many others to explore and track and experiment with going forward.  The shifts never stop.

Popularity

The ecosystem is a social place.  Fashion and social pressure play significant roles in decision making.  Collective actions alter the price of assets, and the forces of migration and aggregation amplify the trends.

Gauging popularity and acting on assessments about it is tricky business.  While it’s very evident that private equity is extremely popular right now, the wind continues to be at its back.  Surveys show still-increasing interest among institutional asset owners, and individual investors are clamoring for a bite of the apple, including in their defined contribution plans.

That momentum is supported by the accumulated buildup of implementation infrastructure among both managers and investors — and the reluctance to lean away from a powerful trend.  Until something shakes devotion like that, it tends to intensify.

At the same time, if higher prices are paid for the same economic outcomes, popularity sows the seeds of diminishing future returns.  (A good exposition of that idea can be found in a book, Popularity: A Bridge between Classical and Behavioral Finance, from the CFA Institute Research Foundation.)

ESG is among the most fascinating examples of these principles at work today.  The popularity of the ideas behind those three letters (especially the “E”) has dramatically altered organizations and strategies and the pricing of some assets, all within a relatively short period of time.  (There will be more to come about the broad impact of these developments in future postings.)

Order and disorder

At every level and in every node — and across the ecosystem as a whole — there are movements of order and disorder.

Much of the time, we operate in a pretty-well-ordered world.  That allows for the implementation of practices and the selling of ideas and products within an accepted context.  But in a complex adaptive system, increasing order and rigidity give way to bouts of disorder — and reordering.

The triggers for the changes can come from all sorts of places.  Economic and social developments are the most prominent; despite increasing financialization, the causation arrow runs primarily in one direction.  The largest disruptions start outside the investment ecosystem, which is tuned to the environment that has been in place.

But destabilizing forces can come from within as well.  Innovation (another force worth mentioning) sometimes builds in complexities and risks that lie in wait, only to surface at an inopportune time.

Regulatory actions are important factors too:  intended to create greater order, they often cause ripple effects of disorder (and sometimes quite unexpected consequences).

~~~

All of these forces are constantly at work, altering opportunities and risks in the prices of assets and the fortunes of market players.  The ever-shifting landscape presents a map of possibilities for investment organizations and professionals to explore.

Published: November 9, 2021

Subscribe

To comment, please send an email to editor@investmentecosystem.com. Comments are for the editor and are not viewable by readers.

Why Do Asset Owners Pay for Beta?

The Bloomberg headline reads, “BlackRock’s Hedge Fund Star Gets Paid More Than CEO Larry Fink.”  To put a point on it, the author of the article estimates that Alister Hibbert “earned a nine-figure sum more than triple the size of CEO Larry Fink’s $30 million payout.”

Hibbert manages the BlackRock Strategic Equity Hedge Fund, and “has the final call on investments,” working in conjunction with Michael Constantis and three analysts.  Here’s a chart of the returns since inception:

That’s a good decade of performance.  While there’s not much information provided regarding the tactics and exposures of the fund to figure out what the proper benchmark might be, the returns appear attractive.  The comparative chart above doesn’t easily reveal the periods of over- and underperformance, but the article says, “During the S&P 500’s worst ten months over the past decade, Hibbert underperformed just once and made money during half of them.”

Had that record been posted by a mutual fund manager, it would have drawn attention and assets — and no doubt would have resulted in attractive compensation.  But assuming that Hibbert reinvested his share of the performance fees, Bloomberg thinks he could have made $350 million from the hedge fund so far.  A bit beyond “attractive compensation.”

If the S&P 500 is a general representation of “beta,” then the fairly minor cumulative relative return for the fund over ten years seems wildly out of sync with the estimated wealth transfer.

There’s a simple reason for that disconnect, of course.  It’s a hedge fund.  BlackRock earned close to a half billion dollars in incentive fees on the fund’s performance last year, because it gets 20% of the upside, whether it’s alpha or beta.

Why do institutional and individual asset owners pay for beta?  Tradition.

When you think about it, that’s not a good reason.  Certainly last year’s net performance would have been nice to have, and such occurrences will ensure that there will be “a waiting list of investors eager to replace anyone that wants out” of the fund, which is now closed to new clients.

There are more egregious examples than this one, funds where poor relative performance and big paydays are coupled together.  At least that’s not the case here.  But it still highlights the misalignment designed into most hedge fund structures (and many other vehicles in the “alternatives” category).

Will asset owners ever design it out?

Published: November 4, 2021

Subscribe

To comment, please send an email to editor@investmentecosystem.com. Comments are for the editor and are not viewable by readers.

Lessons From a Hedge Fund Manager

In 2020, Paul Marshall, who co-founded the hedge fund firm Marshall Wace, wrote 10½ Lessons from Experience: Perspectives on Fund Management.  He called it a “small publication.”

Indeed, the book is slight in form and a quick read, but it sets forth a statement of beliefs that touches on many important concepts.  Therefore, you can use it to compare and contrast the views espoused to your own beliefs, as a jumping-off point for more in-depth examination of those concepts, or as the narrative frame against which you could do due diligence on the firm.

In the introduction, “The Great Disconnect,” Marshall says that “axiomatic thinking is inherently dangerous in the social sciences — basically in any domain which involves human agency in the systems you are trying to model and predict.”  Yet, the rationalist train of thought “led by the Chicago School . . . remains to this day remarkably disconnected from financial market practice.”  Not a surprising view coming from a practitioner of active management.

(The section headings below, other than the last one, are the lessons that serve as the titles of the book’s chapters.  None of the links used come from the book.)

Markets are inefficient

The biggest battle regarding investment beliefs concerns the efficiency of markets.  For Marshall, “Price formation happens with varying degrees of inefficiency, and price formation is typically volatile and non-linear.”  Not at all what the theorists of efficiency believe.

In contrast, Marshall cites the work of Benoit Mandelbrot, who shone a light on the normal distribution as an unrealistic representation of how markets actually work — even though it still underlies most tools of investment analysis.  The reflexivity theory of George Soros illuminated that disconnect, positing that “markets not only anticipate economic developments but actually drive them and are in turn driven by them, because ‘human beings are not merely scientific observers but also active participants in the system.’ ”

Generally, markets grow more efficient over time, but new inefficiencies develop and market crises spawn those reflexive reactions that belie the notion of efficiency as a governing force.

Humans are irrational

Marshall Wace tracks its portfolio managers and outside contributors in reference to the behavioral biases identified by Daniel Kahneman, Amos Tversky, and others.

In his review of some of the more common biases, Marshall admits that he is most prone to optimism bias (“I am too easily romanced by new stories and new opportunities”), while his partner Ian Wace tends toward mean reversion bias, a form of the “gambler’s fallacy.”  As he notes, “Taken together our style biases were a good hedge to each other,” in contrast to organizations where similarity is prized over balance.

He attacks the problem of overconfidence, writing, “When someone is doing well their portfolio should be subject to extra scrutiny and their ego deflated.”  (That is in stark opposition to the normal fawning treatment of them during periods like that.)  And he warns of a “more subtle form of sunk cost fallacy, relating to the irrational weight given to the time an investor has spent analyzing an opportunity.”

Investment skill is measurable and persistent

This lesson is among the most controversial, especially the “persistent” part of it.  To dive into the definitions of persistency and the measurement of skill is beyond this posting — and beyond Marshall’s short book.  But with more than twenty years of data, he believes “we are able to identify persistent skill with a high degree of confidence.”

But the percentage of successful trades for those with skill is a mere 52-53%, and the average for “a truly great manager” is only 55%.  Not what most outsiders would expect.

Of note, “the main threats to persistent performance are all character related” and “the reddest flags for underperformance . . . are problems in people’s personal lives — the three Ds of death, divorce and disease.”

In the short term the market is a voting machine, in the long term it is a weighing machine

This quote from Benjamin Graham gets thrown around a lot.  Within this lesson, Marshall also looks at John Maynard Keynes, who “likened investing to choosing the winner of a beauty contest.”  Keynes wrote of the process as “anticipating what average opinion expects the average opinion to be.  And there are some, I believe, who practice the fourth, fifth and higher degrees [of reading those layers of opinion].”  You might see a connection to Soros’ reflexivity there.

Marshall says that his firm tries to combine the two kinds of machines, with its quant trading operation being in the voting business, while its fundamental managers try to weigh what will win out over longer time horizons.

Seek change

While Marshall emphasizes the importance of catalysts in causing the revaluation of securities, he points out that you have to be nimble and willing to get into an idea early to really gain an advantage:

By the time a story becomes so well packaged that it can be pumped on CNBC or at Breakers or the Sohn Conference it is probably too late.  The interesting moment is when the idea is just in its dawn, half-glimpsed and half-understood.

And he highlights the importance of the narrative — and how typical due diligence approaches fall victim to manager narratives:

What everyone should know is that it is very easy to tell a story about a stock.  Your ability to tell a story has almost nothing to do with your ability to pick stocks.  In the case of some successful managers, it is almost inversely correlated.  Yet it is the staple, still, of many due diligence processes.  By all means ask questions about stocks for entertainment and to illustrate the process of the manager.  But don’t give it much weight in your due diligence.

Here, uncharacteristically for an asset manager, Marshall encourages those doing due diligence to resist the easy narratives that managers put forth.  (Instead, the goal should be to crack the narratives.)

The best portfolio construction combines concentration with diversification

That sounds like a contradiction.

How can these two perspectives be reconciled?

The answer is that you cannot fully reconcile them at the level of a single portfolio — there are trade-offs between concentration and diversification, between return and risk.  But you can reconcile them at the level of the business and at the level of the clients.

Marshall wants concentrated pools that come from different sources to be combined together at the allocation level.  Therefore, he favors “platform” hedge funds which feature pods with many discrete strategies, and presumably would argue for an asset owner taking a similar approach across its portfolio.

Shorts are different from longs

For starters, “the informational bias of the market is entirely structured against the short seller.”  Plus, the mechanics of implementation are daunting.  While Marshall outlines the characteristics that make for a good short, it’s not an area for the faint of heart or the inexperienced.

A machine beats a man, but a man plus a machine beats a machine

This speaks to one of the most important topics of the day.  Marshall thinks that fundamental, systematic, and quantamental investing will converge further — and that each requires technological prowess for success.  By 2023, he expects his firm to be processing twenty petabytes of data per day, ample evidence that the game has changed from years gone by.

Risk management — respect uncertainty

The concepts of “risk” and “uncertainty” get conflated, and the industry’s cavalier use of the terms doesn’t help.  Statistical measures of “risk” can be used to guide exposures, but reliance on them as the essence of “risk management” overlooks the real uncertainty that exists.  Leverage, illiquidity, and the presence of real actors can easily overwhelm modeled scenarios.  (See reflexivity again.)

Size matters

The “guilty secret of the fund management business”?

Beyond a certain level of AuM, size becomes an impediment to skill-based returns as it raises trading costs in a non-linear fashion and reduces the flexibility of trading and risk management.

Marshall believes that a fundamental equity strategy should be “capped anywhere from $1-3 billion in capital.”  (That said, according to its website, Marshall Wace has more than $55 billion in assets spread across its different kinds of approaches.  How well will the “concentration plus diversification” approach deliver returns going forward with that kind of scale?)

And now for that half lesson . . .

Most fund management careers end in failure

“When a fund manager is popular, investors rush to their fund, pumping it up to a size which makes it increasingly challenging to deliver the same return per unit of risk.”  Then follows the loss of the manager’s halo, redemptions, and forced liquidations of assets, sometimes little by little and sometimes all at once.

(Ironically, such “failures” leave the managers with very large nest eggs, yet even in some famous funds investors on balance lose money, since the strongest performance often occurs when a fund is small.)

The final paragraph of the book:

Ultimately, of course, it is all about character.  If you do not begin your fund management career with a sense of your fallibility, you are likely to learn it.  If you do not learn it, you are likely to fail.

Lessons and beliefs

Any attempt to summarize lessons learned confronts the problem of where to land between a simple list and a weighty tome.  Marshall strikes a good balance, conveying the essence of his thinking and his firm’s approach.

Given the brevity of the book, the natural response is to want more information.  Among the topics of interest is TOPS:

TOPS (“Trade-Optimised Portfolio System”) is the name given to Marshall Wace’s “alpha capture” strategy, in which we ask outside contributors from the brokerage community to input their best ideas into an online portal which allows us to track their performance and to identify those contributors who have reliable information to offer.

The data would be fascinating to parse — no doubt providing an insightful study in behavioral finance — as would learning more about the implementation process.  How do the choices of the contributors ebb and flow in response to market dynamics?  Are the more persistent and strongest signals coming from those who are wrong or those who are right?  How are their firms rewarded or penalized in terms of trading business?  How are signals used directly and indirectly by Marshall Wace?

Such questions and many others are prompted by Paul Marshall’s book, which provides a peek inside a successful asset management firm and how theory, practice, beliefs, and lessons have melded into its approach.

Published: November 3, 2021

Subscribe

To comment, please send an email to editor@investmentecosystem.com. Comments are for the editor and are not viewable by readers.

Setting Expectations, the Everything Crackdown, and Good Reads

The Fortnightly is delivered via email to free and paid subscribers, and is available to all online.  If you see something (or produce something) that merits inclusion, please pass it on.

Setting expectations

In a recent paper, AQR asks an important question, “What’s the Worst That Should Happen?”  From the conclusion:

Expected returns across a range of asset classes today are lower than their historical averages, yet the same is not true for expected risks.  The past decade presented overall very friendly conditions for stocks and bonds (generally growth above forecasts, inflation below, and falling yields), but it would be imprudent to assume these conditions will repeat themselves over the next decade.  Setting expectations — for investors, boards, and other stakeholders — is arguably going to be much more important from here.

Expectations tend to get out of whack when things have been good.  Despite a few short crises here and there, it has been onward and upward for most of the last forty years.  As AQR says, “The big risk for investors with multi-year horizons isn’t short-term worst outcomes; it’s long-term ones.”  And we’ve been lulled into thinking that those kind of things don’t happen.

It’s the time of year when endowments report their returns, and the results have been eye-popping.  And, according to Milliman, the funded status for the largest pension plans jumped to 85%, around 15% higher than it has been the last few years.  As Institutional Investor summarizes, “Now Comes the Hard Part.”

Despite the good times, asset owners charged with meeting liabilities (or budgeted expected returns) are faced with a dilemma at a time when valuations are high across almost all asset classes.  Do you dial back your expectations and wait for better opportunities or continue to increase the exposure to riskier assets?

The everything crackdown

Gary Gensler has come out of the gate quickly as chair of the Securities and Exchange Commission.  A Bloomberg headline says it all:  “SEC Chief to Wall Street: The Everything Crackdown Is Coming.”  The story details a number of areas that are under scrutiny (among others):  gamification, SPACs, climate change disclosures, ESG, swaps, short sales, market structure changes, and Chinese stock listings.

In the U.K., the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) has been much more aggressive in rulemaking over the last decade than has the SEC.  Now, when many have been working at home, it has announced, “We should be able to access firms’ sites, records and employees.  It’s important that firms are prepared and take responsibility to ensure employees understand that the FCA has powers to visit any location where work is performed, business is carried out and employees are based (including residential addresses) for any regulatory purposes.  This includes supervisory and enforcement visits.”

The pressures aren’t just coming from regulators.  Bloomberg Law reported that there are “serious disruptions” in the market for fiduciary insurance “because of the extraordinary number of lawsuits challenging 401(k) plan fees.”  The head of fiduciary and employment practices liability at Berkshire Hathaway said, “It just keeps spreading.  Exposure is metastasizing.”  And it’s not just big organizations that are targets, but smaller ones, including private firms and nonprofits.  (In addition, there are suits related to performance; here’s an example via NAPA.  And there’s a debate brewing about the appropriateness of active funds in plans.)  It’s getting tougher to be a fiduciary.

Good reads

TIFF is celebrating its thirtieth anniversary with a hub of content to which it adds an item each month.  Here is David Salem’s 1999 thought piece, “Message in a Bottle,” which examines the foundational beliefs and investment policies of the organization at that time.  More than two decades later, it remains a good example for asset owners to ponder, right down to the tidy summary of the structure and rationale of the policy portfolio at the end.

McKinsey released its annual report on the asset management industry:  “Notwithstanding the pandemic’s threat to the global economy and financial markets, 2020 ended up being a record year for the asset management industry.”

Cliffwater issued an analysis, “The Prevalence and Impact of GP-Led Secondary Transactions.”  Secondaries have gained in popularity (and aren’t trading at the sometimes-big discounts that show up during periods of stress); this short summary lays out governance and conflict-of-interest issues, as well as what the firm believes are some best practices.

The module on how to decompose an asset manager’s process is the most popular one in the Investment Ecosystem Academy online course on due diligence and manager selection.  Here’s an interesting Twitter thread from @Chariot_Invest on manager process (and marketing).

Speaking of regulation, RIABiz reports that “RIAs may face ticking time bomb after SEC slams a $1.9-billion RIA for neglecting ‘orphan’ accounts while charging fees, a problem that may be industrywide.”

“The futility of decision making research” is a remarkable piece of academic writing.  Nearing the end of their careers, the authors bemoan the path of the work in their field.  Why is it relevant to investment professionals?  Because the popular research on decision making is often based on experiments unlike the “real decisions of the sort [that people] might face in the real world.”

Oh, and:  “Deutsche Bank Whistleblower Gets $200 Million Bounty for Tip on Libor Misconduct.”

Subscriber postings

Each edition of Fortnightly will have a link to the archives page of the website, and will highlight some postings from the previous two weeks.

The seven initial postings have covered a range of ideas from different parts of the ecosystem, including tactical asset allocation, factor returns, innovation in organizations, the allure (and anchoring) of return targets, and a good Learning Curve linkfest.  Plus, the problem of overconfidence in investment practice and three important dimensions for asset managers (using ARK Investment Management as an example).

Follow The Investment Ecosystem on Twitter.

Published: October 31, 2021

Subscribe

To comment, please send an email to editor@investmentecosystem.com. Comments are for the editor and are not viewable by readers.

How Innovative Is Your Organization?

Well-crafted opinion surveys can be used within organizations to provide insights, even at small sample sizes, by demonstrating the prevailing breadth of views on a particular issue or question.

The range of responses is often wider than the participants in the survey — or the leaders of the organization — expect.  In part, that’s due to the fact that there is a natural dispersion in how people calibrate their responses on a rating scale (which can be exacerbated by poorly-worded questions).

In addition, the members of an organization have a spectrum of beliefs, even on matters that appear to be (or are reported/marketed to be) settled business.  Some individuals hide their beliefs due to social pressure, while others may have changed their views but not voiced them yet.

Consider ESG, the hot-button issue of the day.  Within a typical investment team there is usually a range of views about how investment and ESG issues should be balanced (or if they should be balanced at all).  Now think about such a team operating within a nonprofit organization; cultural disconnects between investment personnel and others are common and differences of opinion on ESG can be stark.

Zooming out even further, an investment committee made up of industry professionals — or a board of directors — may think about the ESG question in divergent ways, to say nothing of donors and prospective donors.  Arriving at shared beliefs can be a challenge (or a battle); understanding the landscape comes first.

The “investment innovators curve”

In a similar fashion, surveys are commonly used throughout the industry to reveal the range of opinions and actions across organizations.  For example, Fidelity Institutional surveyed a variety of asset owners for its paper, “Understand Your Placement on the Investment Innovators Curve.”

It asked the respondents to self-characterize their organizations as fitting into one of these classifications:

Innovators:  “We are frequently one of the first to try a new asset class or investment approach, even if it’s extremely new and/or unproven.”

Early Adopters:  “We are not the first to try a new asset class or investment approach, but will quickly follow if we notice others are trying it.”

Early Majority:  “We are curious about new asset classes or investment approaches, but are more pragmatic.  We’ll wait until it’s more common/established before investing.”

Late Majority:  “We adopt a new asset class or investment approach out of necessity.  Once it’s mainstream and has clear, demonstrated value, we’ll invest in it.”

Laggards:  “We are very risk averse when adding new asset classes or investment approaches to our portfolio.  We would rather be late to a new investing trend than bear the potential risks involved with new approaches.”

Fidelity has been tracking decision making by institutional investors for two decades.  The question on innovation this year was “designed to help firms define and understand the philosophical drivers of their organization’s processes and investment approach.”  (The use of word “firms” several times in the paper is odd; “asset owners” would be a better choice.)

Not surprisingly, those on the tails of the innovation curve — innovators and laggards — operate quite differently.  The governance structures of the former allow for decision making to be pushed down in the organization, providing for greater flexibility, more creativity, and more expansive allocation choices.

Innovation in your organization

Among Fidelity’s recommendations for organizations:

Explore best practices within your philosophical peer group to better understand emerging trends or potential changes you need to make in order to achieve return targets.

Incorporate this new dimension into how your organization evaluates itself; build a plan to consistently benchmark your portfolio and organizational performance against your peers on the Investment Innovators Curve.

Inherent in them is the standard industry operating procedure of benchmarking, with the suggestion to do so specifically against organizations that have similar innovation profiles.  Essentially, “don’t try to play someone else’s game,” which is generally good advice.

But such benchmarking tends to land on asset allocation, which is easier to compare than other organizational attributes, and Fidelity’s work mostly points in that direction.  (A webinar that was a follow-on to the paper offered very little about innovation; it mostly dealt with long-term capital market assumptions, asset allocation, and the like.)

However, another recommendation that was offered is spot on:

Use the innovators curve framework as a starting point for discussing and agreeing on your firm’s investment philosophy and its inherent trade-offs.

The various positions along the innovators curve have their pros and cons, their (apparent) risks and returns.  Where is your organization and where do you think it should be (and why)?

A simple survey using the scale and descriptions proposed by Fidelity is likely to surface quite a range of views — within the investment team, throughout the governance chain, and across other stakeholders.

There is much more to do beyond that, including breaking down what innovation means to you, checking your work to see that your self-characterization matches what the evidence shows, and building an R&D effort to support the choices you make on how to position your organization.  But start by finding out where everyone thinks you are now.  You may be surprised.

 

Future postings will focus on specific topics in innovation and R&D — in the Asset Owner category and across all of the Investment Ecosystem offerings.

Published: October 29, 2021

Subscribe

To comment, please send an email to editor@investmentecosystem.com. Comments are for the editor and are not viewable by readers.

Two Decades of Factor Returns

The Dow Jones U.S. Thematic Market Neutral Indices are, according to the methodology page for them, “a family of weighted return strategy indices that each reflect the performance of offsetting long/short allocations in two component indices.”  They were launched in August 2011 (the vertical line in the charts), but backtested history starts at the end of 2001.

Each index shown below is a long/short blending of two components, rebalanced quarterly to equally weight two hundred stocks long and two hundred short.  Sector neutrality is maintained between them.

This chart shows the two factors that have received the most attention over time.  The Value Index uses three valuation measures to form the long (cheapest) and short (more expensive) portfolios.  The Size Index is long the smallest stocks and short the largest.

The factors each outperformed over the first dozen years of the chart, but then underperformed significantly until bouncing in mid-2020.  Broadly speaking, their trajectories reflect the rise in popularity of (and asset flow into) “smart beta” strategies — and the subsequent disappointment as performance deteriorated.

The other three factors in the group are shown here.  The scale of the chart is the same as on the first one, so you can see that these were generally less volatile than value and size.  They didn’t have a similar migration up and down over the two decades, with the most noticeable moves occurring during periods of market trauma in 2002, 2008, and 2020.

The Quality Index (a factor for which the definitions tend to vary quite a bit across the industry) is sorted by return on equity and debt-to-equity ratios.  The Momentum Index is long high momentum and short low momentum, while the Beta Index is long low beta and short high beta.

It is worth noting that there are different approaches to displaying factor returns, so other calculations will vary, but the profiles are similar.

Two decades is not that long in market time, even though lots of products are marketed with much shorter track records and investor memories fade more quickly than they should.  Using this time period leaves out some important earlier patterns.

Regarding this particular family of indices, Cliff Asness wrote that their starting point “means they miss what was a very strong period for factors in the mid-to-late 1990s, a very bad period for the value factor and for most reasonable combinations of quant factors during the tech bubble, and a big part of the recovery from the tech bubble craziness from 4/2000–12/2001.”

The factor story of twenty years ago — and the one of ten years ago — differed from today’s.  As with everything, the evidence changes over time.

Published: October 26, 2021

Subscribe

To comment, please send an email to editor@investmentecosystem.com. Comments are for the editor and are not viewable by readers.